Abstract. In this article, we study the problem of online market clearing where there is one commodity in the market being bought and sold by multiple buyers and sellers whose bids arrive and expire at different times. The auctioneer is faced with an online clearing problem of deciding which buy and sell bids to match without knowing what bids will arrive in the future. For maximizing profit, we present a (randomized) online algorithm with a competitive ratio of ln( p max − p min )+1, when bids are in a range [ p min , p max ], which we show is the best possible. A simpler algorithm has a ratio twice this, and can be used even if expiration times are not known. For maximizing the number of trades, we present a simple greedy algorithm that achieves a factor of 2 competitive ratio if no money-losing trades are allowed. We also show that if the online algorithm is allowed to subsidize matches-match money-losing pairs if it has already collected enough money from previous pairs to pay for them-then it can actually be 1-competitive with respect to the optimal offline algorithm that is not allowed subsidy. That is, for maximizing the number of trades, the ability to subsidize is at least as valuable as knowing the future. We also consider objectives of maximizing buy or sell volume and social welfare. We present all of these results as corollaries of theorems on online matching in an incomplete interval graph.
Introduction
Exchanges (aka double auctions)-that is, centralized markets with potentially multiple buyers and multiple sellers-are perhaps the most important institutions for conducting commerce. Well-known applications include markets for stocks, bonds, commodities, and derivatives. Several independent business-to-business exchanges have also been founded (e.g., ChemConnect). In addition, large established companies have started to form buying consortia such as Covisint, Exostar, and Trade-Ranger, and large-scale sourcing of transportation services has been collaboratively conducted by manufacturers and their retailer customers [Sandholm et al. 2006, page 60] . These sourcing trends mean that instead of one company buying from multiple suppliers, we have multiple companies buying from multiple suppliers. In other words, part of sourcing is moving toward an exchange format. Exchanges have also started to play roles in the allocation of bandwidth, as well as in resource allocation in operating systems and computational grids.
These trends have led to an increasing need for fast market clearing algorithms for exchanges. Such algorithms have been studied in the offline (batch) context [Sandholm and Suri 2002, 2003; Wurman et al. 1998a ; Sandholm and Suri 2006] . Also, recent electronic commerce server prototypes such as eMediator [Sandholm 2002] and AuctionBot [Wurman et al. 1998b] have demonstrated a wide variety of new market designs, leading to the need for new clearing algorithms.
In this article, we study the ubiquitous setting where there is a market for one commodity, for example, the stock of a single company, oil, electricity, memory chips, or CPU time, and clearing decisions must be made online. For simplicity, we assume that each buy bid and each sell bid is for a single unit of the commodity (to buy or sell multiple units, a bidder could submit multiple bids 1 ). In these settings, the auctioneer has to clear the market (match buy and sell bids) without knowing what the future buy/sell bids will be. The auctioneer faces the tradeoff of clearing all possible matches as they arise versus waiting for additional buy/sell bids before matching. Waiting can lead to a better matching, but can also hurt because some of the existing bids might expire or get retracted as the bidders get tired of waiting.
We formalize the problem faced by the auctioneer as an online problem in which buy and sell bids arrive over time. When a bid is introduced, the auctioneer learns the bid price and expiration time (though some of the simpler algorithms will not need to know the expiration times). At any point in time, the auctioneer can match a live buy bid with a live sell bid, removing the pair from the system. We will consider the problem both from the perspective of pure online algorithms-in which our goal is to design algorithms for the auctioneer whose performance is comparable to the best achievable in hindsight for the bid sequence observed-and from the perspective of incentive-compatible mechanism design, in which we also are concerned that it be in the bidders' interests to actually bid their true valuations.
Note that while the Securities Exchange Commission imposes relatively strict rules on the matching process in securities markets like NYSE and NASDAQ [Domowitz 1993] , there are large numbers of other markets on which items other than securities are being exchanged (e.g., commodities markets and business-tobusiness trading). In those markets, the exchange (AKA auctioneer) has significant flexibility in deciding which buy bids and sell bids to accept. In this article, we will study how well the auctioneer can do in those settings, and with what algorithms.
1.1. BASIC DEFINITIONS. We will assume that all bids and valuations are integer-valued (e.g., that money cannot be split more finely than pennies) and lie in some range [ p min , p max ]. Definition 1.1. A temporal clearing model consists of a set B of buy bids and a set S of sell bids. Each bid v ∈ B ∪ S has a positive price p (v) , is introduced at a time t i (v), and is removed at a time t f (v) . A bid v is said to be alive in the interval [t i (v) , t f (v)]. Two bids v, v ∈ B ∪ S are said to be concurrent if there is some time when both are alive simultaneously. An offline algorithm receives knowledge of all buy and sell bids up front. An online algorithm only learns of bids when they are introduced. Both types of algorithms have to produce a legal matching: that is, a buy bid and sell bid can only be matched if they are concurrent. In our basic model, if the algorithm matches buy bid b with sell bid s (buying from the seller and selling to the buyer), it receives a profit of p (b) − p(s) . We will use competitive analysis [Borodin and El-Yaniv 1998 ] to measure the quality of an online algorithm, comparing its performance on a bid sequence (in expectation, if the algorithm is randomized) to that of the optimal offline solution for the same sequence. Note that in this measure we do not worry that had we acted differently, we might have seen a better sequence of bids: the comparison is only to the optimum on the sequence observed. Formally, the competitive ratio of an algorithm is the worst-case, over all possible bid sequences, of the ratio of its performance to the optimal offline solution on that sequence. We will consider several measures of "performance", including total profit, number of trades, and social welfare (see Section 1.3).
In Section 5.2, we consider a generalization of the temporal clearing model in which bidders can change their bids over time. In this generalization, each bid can be a function of time, with only the values so far revealed to the online algorithm, and the goal of the algorithm is to be competitive with the optimal offline solution for the actual functions.
The basic competitive-analysis model implicitly treats bidders as truthful in the sense that it takes the bids as they come and compares to the offline optimum on the same bid sequence. This is a reasonable model in settings where the gaps between buy and sell bids are fairly small compared to the prices themselves, and where true valuations are difficult to quantify (e.g., say in a stock market). However, we also consider in Section 6 the more general model of incentive-compatible mechanism design, in which we assume each bidder has a private valuation for the commodity, and our goal is to compete with respect to the optimal offline solution for the actual valuations of all the bidders. In this context, if we want the bidders to bid their true valuations, the mechanism needs to make it be in their interest to do so. We assume, though we relax this for some of our results, that the start and end times for bids are not manipulable: the only control agents have is over their bid values.
2 Even this, however, provides a sharp contrast between the setting of exchanges, which we consider here, and the simpler case of auctions.
AUCTIONS VERSUS EXCHANGES.
Competitive analysis of auctions (multiple buyers submitting bids to one seller) has been conducted by a number of authors [Bagchi et al. 2001; Bar-Yossef et al. 2002; Blum et al. 2004; Goldberg et al. 2000 Goldberg et al. , 2001 Lavi and Nisan 2000] in both online and offline settings. In this article, we present the first competitive analysis of online exchanges (where there can be multiple buyers and multiple sellers submitting bids over time). Competitive analysis of 1-shot exchanges (all bids concurrent) has been performed by Deshmukh et al. [2002] . Exchanges are a generalization of auctions-one could view an exchange as a number of overlapping auctions-and they give rise to additional issues. For example, if a seller does not accept a buy bid, some other seller might.
There are two primary differences between auctions and exchanges with respect to the design of algorithms. The first is that in addition to the basic question of what profit threshold to require per sale, for exchanges there is the additional complication of deciding which bids meeting that criterion one should in fact match (e.g., maximizing the number of profitable trades is trivial for an auction). So achieving an optimal competitive ratio will require performing both tasks optimally. A second more subtle distinction, however, which impacts issues of incentivecompatibility, concerns the relation between prices and profit. In the context of auctions, there must exist a fixed sales price that achieves profit within a logarithmic factor of the optimal offline solution (in fact, the algorithms of Bagchi et al. [2001] , Borodin and El-Yaniv [1998], and El-Yaniv et al. [1992] work by selecting a sales price from a specific distribution, so clearly the best fixed sales price must be at least as good). However, for exchanges, there need not exist a fixed pair of buy and sell prices that achieves a logarithmic, or even sublinear competitive ratio with respect to the optimum profit. For example, if day i contains a buyer at price i and seller at price i + 1, the optimal offline profit in n days is n, but any fixed pair of prices will produce only one match and so can make at most 1.
3 Instead, what we show must exist in hindsight is a good profit margin per trade, that when combined with an appropriate matching algorithm, yields a large profit.
The net result of this distinction (between profit margins and a fixed pair of prices) is a difference between what can be achieved in the pure online model and what can be achieved by incentive-compatible algorithms when optimizing for profit. Specifically, on the positive side we give an optimal, ln( p max − p min ) + 1-competitive, online algorithm for maximizing profit, but which is not incentivecompatible. On the negative side, we show that in fact no individually rational (it is in bidders' interests to participate) incentive-compatible direct mechanism can achieve a competitive ratio for profit that is sublinear in p max − p min , even in the case of just one buyer and one seller. However, on the positive side again we present an incentive-compatible algorithm using online learning methods that performs nearly as well as the best fixed pair of buy and sell prices, so long as traffic is not too bursty.
(In contrast to the linear lower bound on incentive compatible profit maximization, on the positive side, we show an incentive compatible 2 ln( p max / p min )-competitive algorithm for maximizing social welfare.)
1.3. OBJECTIVES CONSIDERED AND RESULTS. In this article, we consider a number of objectives. Our goal, for each objective function we consider, will be to produce online algorithms with optimal competitive ratios. Specifically, we consider the following goals: -Maximize Profit. Each pair of buy and sell bids that are matched produces a profit, which in our basic model is the difference between the buy bid and the sell bid. The total profit is the sum of these differences, over all matched pairs. Offline, the matching that optimizes profit can be found via weighted bipartite matching. We present a (randomized) online algorithm with competitive ratio ln( p max − p min ) + 1, which we show is the best possible. A simpler algorithm has ratio twice this, and can be used even if expiration times are not known. These algorithms build on analysis of El-Yaniv et al. [1992] for the one-way-trading problem. We also show how online learning results [Blum and Burch 2000; Freund and Schapire 1996; Littlestone and Warmuth 1994] can be used to produce algorithms with even stronger guarantees-a competitive ratio approaching 1 with respect to the optimal fixed threshold on profit per trade (see Section 5.1)-if bids are not too bursty. This idea has been applied by Bar-Yossef et al. [2002] and Blum et al. [2004] to the simpler context of online auctions.
In Section 6, we consider the issue of incentive-compatible mechanism design, where we prove both a negative result and a positive result. On the negative side, we show no direct, individually rational, incentive-compatible mechanism can achieve a competitive ratio that is sublinear in p max − p min . On the positive side, however, we give an incentive-compatible algorithm that performs well with respect to the best fixed pair of buy and sell prices (low additive regret so long as bids are not too bursty) using online learning techniques. -Maximize Liquidity. Liquidity maximization is important for a marketplace for several reasons. The success and reputation of an electronic marketplace is often measured in terms of liquidity, and this affects the (acquisition) value of the party that runs the marketplace. Also, liquidity attracts buyers and sellers to the marketplace; after all, they want to be able to buy and sell. We analyze three common measures of liquidity: (1) number of trades, (2) sum of the prices of the cleared buy bids (buy volume), and (3) sum of the prices of the cleared sell bids (sell volume). Under criterion 1, the goal is to maximize the number of trades made, rather than the profit, subject to not losing money. We show that a simple greedy algorithm achieves a factor of 2 competitive ratio, if no money-losing trades are allowed. This can be viewed as a variant on the online bipartite matching problem [Karp et al. 1990 ]. Interestingly, we show that if the online algorithm is allowed to subsidize matches-match money-losing pairs if it has already collected enough money from previous pairs to pay for them-then it can be 1-competitive with respect to the optimal offline algorithm that is not allowed subsidy. That is, the ability to subsidize is at least as valuable as knowing the future. (If the offline algorithm can also subsidize, then no finite competitive ratio is possible).
For the problems of maximizing buy or sell volume, we present algorithms that achieve a competitive ratio of 2(ln( p max / p min ) + 1) without subsidization. We also present algorithms that achieve a competitive ratio of ln( p max / p min ) + 1 with subsidization with respect to the optimal offline algorithm that cannot use subsidies. This is the best possible competitive ratio for this setting.
-Maximize Social Welfare. This objective corresponds to maximizing the good of the buyers and sellers in aggregate. Specifically, the objective is to have the items end up in the hands of the agents who value them the most. We obtain an optimal competitive ratio, which is the fixed point of the equation r = ln
. Using an incentive-compatible algorithm, we can achieve a competitive ratio at most twice this.
We develop all of our algorithms in a more general setting we call the incomplete interval-graph matching problem. In this problem, we have a number of intervals (bids), some of which overlap in time, but only some of those may actually be matched (because we can only match a buy to a sell, because the prices must be in the correct order, etc.). By addressing this more general setting, we are able to then produce our algorithmic results as corollaries.
1.4. SUBSEQUENT RELATED WORK. There has been substantial work on online auctions and exchanges subsequent to the initial conference publication of this work; we mention here just a few closely related results. In the case of digital-good auctions (a seller with unlimited supply) and buyers who do not linger (t i (v) = t f (v)), Blum and Hartline [2005] use online learning methods to achieve profit quickly approaching that of the best series of k sales prices. Hajiaghayi et al. [2004] develop algorithms for limited-supply auction problems that are incentive-compatible with respect to both price and timing information, and achieve good performance when bidders' valuations are drawn independently from a distribution. Hajiaghayi et al. [2005] consider the case of an auction of reusable goods and characterize the class of incentive-compatible online allocation rules for this setting, as well as provide auctions with good competitive ratio bounds. Bredin and Parkes [2005] build on the work of Hajiaghayi et al. [2005] , providing a characterization of a wide class of mechanisms for online exchanges that are incentive-compatible with respect to both price and timing information. However, they do not consider the competitive ratios of such methods. Work has also been done on more complex matching problems with multiple related commodities [Gong 2002 ].
An Abstraction: Online Incomplete Interval Graphs
In this section, we introduce an abstraction of the temporal bidding problem that will be useful for producing and analyzing optimal algorithms, and may be useful for analyzing other online problems as well.
Definition 2.1. An incomplete interval graph is a graph G = (V, E), together with two functions t i and t f from V to [0, ∞) such that:
We call t i (v) the start time of v, and t f (v) the expiration time of v. For simplicity, we assume that
An incomplete interval graph can be thought of as an abstraction of the temporal bidding problem where we ignore the fact that bids come in two types (buy and sell) and have prices attached to them, and instead we just imagine a black box "E" that given two bids v, v that overlap in time, outputs an edge if they are allowed to be matched. By developing algorithms for this generalization first, we will be able to more easily solve the true problems of interest.
We now consider two problems on incomplete interval graphs: the online edgeselection problem and the online vertex-selection problem. In the online edgeselection problem, the online algorithm maintains a matching M. The algorithm sees a vertex v at the time it is introduced (i.e., at time t i (v)). At this time, the algorithm is also told of all edges from v to other vertices which have already been introduced. The algorithm can select an edge only when both endpoints of the edge are alive. Once an edge has been selected, it can never be removed. The objective is to maximize the number of edges in the final matching, |M|.
In the online vertex-selection problem, the online algorithm maintains a set of vertices W , with the requirement that there must exist some perfect matching on W . At any point in time, the algorithm can choose two live vertices v and v and add them into W so long as there exists a perfect matching on W ∪ {v, v }. Note that there need not exist an edge between v and v . The objective is to maximize the size of W . So, the vertex-selection problem can be thought of as a less stringent version of the edge-selection problem in that the algorithm only needs to commit to the endpoints of the edges in its matching, but not the edges themselves.
It is easy to see that no deterministic online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio less than 2 for the edge-selection problem.
5 A simple greedy algorithm achieves this ratio: ALGORITHM 1 (GREEDY). When a vertex is introduced, if it can be matched, match it (to any one of the vertices to which it can be matched).
The fact that Greedy achieves a competitive ratio of 2 is essentially folklore (e.g., this fact is mentioned in passing for a related model in Karp et al. [1990] ). For completeness, we give the proof here. THEOREM 2.2. The Greedy algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 2 for the edge-selection problem.
PROOF. Consider an edge (v, v ) in the optimal matching M * . Define v to be the vertex which is introduced first, and v to be the vertex which is introduced second. Then the algorithm will match either v or v . In particular, if v is not matched before v is introduced, then we are guaranteed v will be matched (either to v or some other vertex). Therefore, the number of vertices in the online matching M is at least the number of edges in M * , which means |M| ≥ |M * |/2.
For the vertex-selection problem, we show the following algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 1. That is, it is guaranteed to find (the endpoints of) a maximum matching in G. The first invariant says that the algorithm is complete: it lets no matchable vertex expire, and expired vertices do not later become matchable. The second and third invariants say that the algorithm is cautious. The second invariant says that the algorithm favors vertices which expire earlier over those which expire later. The third invariant states that the algorithm only matches vertices that it has to: no subset of the set of vertices chosen has a perfect matching and contains all of the expired vertices.
6
Since an untaken vertex is a vertex which has been introduced but not matched, no untaken vertices exist at the start of the algorithm. Also, W is empty. Therefore, these invariants vacuously hold at the start.
The proof then considers the three types of events that can occur: a vertex can be introduced, a vertex can expire without being matched, or a vertex can expire and be added with some other vertex to W . We establish that if all the invariants hold before any of these events, then they hold afterwards as well. If the first invariant holds at the termination of the algorithm, then no pair could be added to the set selected. The augmenting path theorem [Berge 1957 ] establishes that the selected set is therefore optimal. See Appendices A and B for a full proof.
Competitive Algorithms for Profit, Liquidity, and Welfare
We now show how the results of Section 2 can be used to design optimal algorithms for the temporal bidding problem for the objectives of maximizing profit, liquidity, and social welfare. In each case, we construct a graph in which vertices are bids and edges are placed between a buy bid and a sell bid if they overlap and meet some additional criteria (such as having a price gap of at least some threshold θ) that will depend on the specific problem. Note that because bids are intervals, if Algorithm 2 chooses to add some pair {v, v } to its matching, the corresponding bids will overlap in time, even though there may not be a direct edge between them in the graph.
3.1. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION. We now return to the temporal bidding problem and show how the above results can be used to achieve an optimal competitive ratio for maximizing profit.
We can convert the profit maximization problem to an incomplete interval graph problem by choosing some θ to be the minimum profit that we will accept to match a pair. So, when translating from the temporal bidding problem to the incomplete interval matching problem, we insert an edge between a concurrent buy bid b and a sell bid s if and only if
The Greedy algorithm (Algorithm 1) then corresponds to the strategy: "whenever there exists a pair of bids in the system that would produce a profit at least θ, match them immediately." Algorithm 2 attempts to be more sophisticated: first of all, it waits until a bid is about to expire, and then considers the possible bids to match to in order of their expiration times. (So, unlike Greedy, this algorithm needs to know what the expiration times are.) Second, it can choose to match a pair with profit less than θ if the actual sets of matched buy and sell bids could have been paired differently in hindsight so as to produce a matching in which each pair yields a profit of at least θ. This is not too bizarre since the sum of surpluses is just the sum of buy prices minus the sum of sell prices, and so does not depend on which was matched to which.
Define M * (G θ ) to be the maximum matching in the incomplete interval graph G θ produced in the above manner. Then, from Theorem 2.2, the greedy edge-selection algorithm achieves a profit of at least 1 2 θ ·|M * (G θ )|. Applying Algorithm 2 achieves surplus of at least θ · |M * (G θ )|. The final issue is how we choose θ. If we set θ to 1, then the number of matched pairs will be large, but each one may produce little surplus. If we set θ deterministically any higher than 1, it is possible the algorithms will miss every pair, and have no surplus even when the optimal matching has surplus. Instead, one approach is to use Classify-and-Randomly-Select [Lipton and Tomkins 1994; Awerbuch et al. 1994 ]: choose θ = 2 i for i chosen at random from {0, 1, . . . , } for = lg( p max − p min ) . In this case, in expectation a 1/( +1) fraction of OPT's profit is from matches made between bids whose prices differ by an amount in the range [θ, 2θ] , and therefore the expected value of θ · |M * (G θ )| is at least 1 2
OPT/( + 1). We can achieve a tighter bound by choosing an exponential distribution as in El-Yaniv et al. [1992] (see also Goldman et al. [2000] ). Specifically, for all
where
. Observe that this is a valid probability distribution. Let OPT be the surplus achieved by the optimal offline algorithm.
. COROLLARY 3.2. The algorithm that chooses θ from the above distribution and then applies Greedy to the resulting graph achieves competitive ratio 2(ln( p max − p min )+1). Replacing Greedy with Algorithm 2 achieves competitive ratio ln( p max − p min ) + 1.
In Section 4, we prove a corresponding lower bound of ln( p max − p min ) + 1 for this problem.
PROOF (OF LEMMA 3.1). Let us focus on a specific pair (b, s) (b, s) because the set of pairs of profit at least θ matched by OPT is a legal matching in the incomplete interval graph. So, it suffices to prove that E[R θ (b, s) 
We do this as follows. First, for x > 1,
One somewhat strange feature of Algorithm 2 is that it may recommend matching a pair of buy and sell bids that actually have negative profit. Since this cannot possibly improve total profit, we can always just ignore those recommendations (even though the algorithm will think that we matched them).
3.2. LIQUIDITY MAXIMIZATION. In this section, we study the online maximization of the different notions of liquidity: number of trades, aggregate price of cleared sell bids, and aggregate price of cleared buy bids.
3.2.1. Maximizing the Number of Trades. Suppose that instead of maximizing profit, our goal is to maximize the number of trades made, subject to the constraint that each matched pair have non-negative profit. This can directly be mapped into the incomplete interval graph edge-matching problem by including an edge for every pair of buy and sell bids that are allowed to be matched together. So, the greedy algorithm achieves competitive ratio of 2, which is optimal for a deterministic algorithm, as we prove in Section 4.3.
However, if the online algorithm can subsidize matches (match a pair of buy and sell bids of negative profit if it has already made enough money to pay for them) then we can use Algorithm 2, and do as well as the optimal solution in hindsight that is not allowed subsidization. Specifically, when Algorithm 2 adds a pair {b, s} to W , we match b and s together, subsidizing if necessary. We know that we always have enough money to pay for the subsidized bids because of the property of Algorithm 2 that its set W always has a perfect matching. We are guaranteed to do as well as the best offline algorithm which is not allowed to subsidize, because the offline solution is a matching in the incomplete interval graph. Thus, the ability to subsidize is at least as powerful as knowing the future. Definition 3.3. Given a matching M the buy-volume is (b,s) 
If we wish to maximize buy volume without subsidization, we can use an algorithm based on the greedy profit algorithm.
ALGORITHM 3. Choose a buy price threshold θ at random. Specifically, for all
and let 
When a buy bid b is introduced, if p(b)
≥
(If p(b) < p(s), then this match involves a subsidy.)
This achieves a competitive ratio of ln( p max / p min ) + 1 with respect to the offline algorithm which does not use subsidy. This is the best ratio that can be achieved (the proof is by threat-based analysis similar to that in Section 4.1).
Maximizing sell volume is analogous to maximizing buy volume. The best competitive ratio we know without using subsidy is 2(ln( p max / p min ) + 1). The best achievable with subsidy against an offline algorithm not allowed to use subsidy is ln( p max / p min ) + 1.
3.3. MAXIMIZING SOCIAL WELFARE. Maximizing social welfare means maximizing the sum of the valuations of the people who are left with an item, that is, matched buyers and unmatched sellers. If B is the set of buy bids that were matched, and S is the set of sell bids that were unmatched, then the term that we wish to maximize is:
Equivalently, if M is our matching, and S is the set of all sell bids, then what we wish to maximize is:
Note that the second term cannot be affected by the algorithm (because we assume that the bids are predetermined). Furthermore, adding a constant to the offline and online algorithms' objective values can only improve the competitive ratio. Therefore, Corollary 3.2 immediately implies we can achieve a competitive ratio of ln( p max − p min ) + 1. However, we can in fact do quite a bit better, using the following algorithm.
ALGORITHM 5. Let A be a given algorithm for matching on an incomplete interval graph with competitive ratio 1/α. Let r be the fixed point of the equation: 
Note that this competitive ratio is at most max(2, ln( p max / p min )).
THEOREM 3.5. The fixed point of Equation 3 is the optimal competitive ratio.
We prove Theorem 3.5 in Section 4.
PROOF (OF THEOREM 3.4).
The technique is similar to Lemma 3.1. First, let us associate utilities from trades with specific sell bids. Define S to be the set of sell bids. Fix an optimal matching M * . Let us define R opt : S → [ p min , p max ] to be the valuation of the person who received the item from seller s in the optimal matching.
If s trades with b, then R opt (s) = p(b). If s does not trade, then R opt (s) = p(s).
Observe that the optimal welfare is W opt (s) = s∈S R opt (s).
For an arbitrary matching M, let us use the notation M b,s (T ) to indicate the number of pairs in M where the buy bid is greater than or equal to T and the sell bid is less than T . Similarly, define M b,s (T ) to be the number of pairs in M where the buy bid and sell bid are both greater than or equal to T . Define M s (T ) to be the number of unmatched sell bids greater than or equal to T . Recall that α is the reciprocal of the competitive ratio of the given matching algorithm A, and so is a lower bound on the fraction of potential trades actually harnessed.
Define N * (T ) to be the number of agents (buyers and sellers) that end up with an item in the optimal matching M * , and have valuation greater than or equal to T . So,
. Let M alg be a matching obtained by an online algorithm. Define N alg (T ) to be the number of agents (buyers and sellers) that end up with an item in the matching M alg , and have valuation greater than or equal to T . Then,
The social welfare achieved by the algorithm is at least
Because T>p min , this is an increasing function of N alg (T ), so the algorithm achieves social welfare at least
Arithmetic manipulation yields
By substitution, we get
By defining R T (s) = αT + (1 − α) p min when R opt (s) ≥ T and R T (s) = p min otherwise, the algorithm is guaranteed to achieve social welfare of at least s∈S R T (s 
between r p min and p max and zero elsewhere:
Thus, for each sell bid s, E[R T (s)] ≥ R opt (s)/r , establishing the result.
Lower Bounds on Competitive Ratios
In this section, we establish that our analysis is tight for these algorithms. Specifically, we show that no algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio lower than ln( p max − p min ) + 1 for the profit maximization problem, no algorithm can achieve competitive ratio lower than the fixed point of r = ln p max − p min (r −1) p min for social welfare, and no deterministic algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than 2 for the trade volume maximization problem without subsidization. We also show that no randomized algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than 4/3 for the trade volume maximization problem without subsidization, though we believe this is a loose bound. Furthermore, on this problem it is impossible to achieve a competitive ratio better than 3/2 without taking into consideration the expiration times of the bids. Also, we prove that our greedy profit-maximizing algorithm does not achieve a competitive ratio better than 2(ln( p max − p min ) + 1) (i.e., our analysis of this algorithm is tight).
4.1. A THREAT-BASED LOWER BOUND FOR PROFIT MAXIMIZATION. In this analysis, we prove a lower bound for the competitive ratio of any online algorithm for profit maximization by looking at a specific set of temporal bidding problems. We prove that even if the algorithm knows that the problem is in this set, it cannot achieve a competitive ratio better than ln( p max − p min ) + 1. This is very similar to the analysis of the continuous version of the one-way trading problem in El-Yaniv et al. [1992] .
For this analysis, assume p min = 0. Consider the situation where you have a single sell bid at price 0 that lasts forever. First, there is a buy bid at price a, and then a continuous stream of increasing buy bids with each new one being introduced after the previous one has expired. The last bid occurs at some value y. Define D(x) to be the probability that the sell bid has not been matched before the bid of x dollars expires. Since it is possible there is only one buy bid, if one wanted to achieve a competitive ratio of r , then D(a) ≤ 1 − 1 r . Also, define Y (y) to be the expected profit of the algorithm. The ratio r is achieved if for all
is the probability density at x.
Observe that one wants to use no more probability mass on a bid than absolutely necessary to achieve the competitive ratio of r , because that probability mass is better used on later bids if they exist. Therefore, for an optimal algorithm, D ( . Integrating:
For the optimal case, we want to just run out of probability mass as y approaches p max . Therefore:
Thus, setting a to 1, and shifting back by p min , one gets a lower bound of ln( p max − p min ) + 1.
GREEDY PROFIT MAXIMIZATION.
The following scenario shows that our analysis of the greedy profit algorithm is tight. Imagine that a buy bid for $2 is introduced at 1:00 (and is good forever), and a sell bid for $1 is introduced at 1:01 (that is also good forever). At 2:00, another buy bid for $2 is introduced, which expires at 3:00. At 3:01, another sell-bid for $1 is introduced. In this scenario, the optimal offline algorithm achieves a profit of $2 (matching the first buy bid to the last sell bid, and the last buy bid to the first sell bid).
With a probability of 1 −
, θ > 1, and the greedy algorithm ignores all of the bids. Otherwise (θ = 1), the greedy algorithm matches the first two bids for a profit of 1 and then cannot match the second two. Therefore, the expected reward is
compared to an optimal of 2.
4.3. LOWER BOUND FOR MAXIMIZING THE NUMBER OF TRADES. Here we establish that no deterministic algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio lower than 2 for maximizing the number of trades without subsidization. Also, no randomized algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio lower than 4/3. Furthermore, without observing the expiration times, it is impossible to achieve a competitive ratio less than 3/2.
Imagine a sell bid s * for $1 is introduced at 1:00 and will expire at 2:00. At 1:01, a buy bid b is introduced for $3, and will expire at 3:00. At 1:02, a buy bid b is introduced for $2, and will expire at 4:00. Now imagine there are two possible sell bids that can be introduced: either a sell bid s for $2.50 at 2:30, or a sell bid s for $1.50 at 3:30. Observe that b can match s, and b can match s . So if s is to appear, s * should match b , and if s is to appear, s * should match b. But when s * expires, the online algorithm does not know which one of s and s will appear. So while a randomized algorithm can guess the correct match to make with a probability of 1/2, the deterministic algorithm must make a decision of which to take before the adversary chooses the example, and so it will choose the wrong match.
Without observing the expiration times, it is impossible achieve a competitive ratio below 3/2. Imagine that a sell bid is introduced at 9:00 AM for $1, and a buy bid is introduced at 9:00 AM for $2. The algorithm must then decide whether these bids should be matched. Suppose an algorithm A matches them with probability p by 10:00 AM. If p ≤ 2/3, then they expire at 10:00 AM and no other bids are seen and the expected reward is less than 2/3 when it could have been 1. If p > 2/3, then the bids last all day. Moreover, there is another buy bid from 1:00 PM to 2:00 PM for $2 and another sell bid from 3:00 PM to 4:00 PM for $1. If the first two bids were unmatched, then one could achieve a profit of 2 whereas the expected reward of the algorithm is (1) p + 2(1 − p) ≤ 4/3. Therefore, no algorithm has a competitive ratio better than 3/2 on these two examples.
LOWER BOUND FOR MAXIMIZING SOCIAL WELFARE.
Maximizing social welfare is a generalization of the continuous one-way trading problem [El-Yaniv et al. 1992] . In particular, imagine that one seller has value p min for the item, and is alive from time 0 onward. If at time t the exchange rate is x, then there is a buy bid that is alive only at time t and has a price p(b) = x. Making a trade is the same as converting the currency. Leaving the seller with the good is the same as trading on the last day at the lowest possible price. Therefore, since the competitive ratio in El-Yaniv et al. [1992] is equal to the competitive ratio in Theorem 3.4, it is the case that Thereom 3.5 holds.
Extensions
In this section, we discuss two natural extensions to the basic model.
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION REVISITED: PERFORMING NEARLY AS WELL AS THE
BEST THRESHOLD IN HINDSIGHT. The algorithm of Corollary 3.2 begins by picking a threshold θ from some distribution. It turns out that under certain reasonable assumptions described below, we can use online learning results to perform within a (1 + ) factor of the best value of θ picked in hindsight, minus an additive term linear in 1/ . This does not violate the optimality of the original algorithm: it could be that all thresholds perform a logarithmic factor worse than OPT. However, one can imagine that in certain natural settings, the best strategy would be to pick some fixed threshold, and in these cases, the modified strategy would be within a (1 + ) factor of optimal.
The basic idea of this approach is to probabilistically combine all the fixedthreshold strategies using the Randomized Weighted Majority algorithm (also called Exponential-Weighting, or Hedge) of Littlestone and Warmuth [1994] and Freund and Schapire [1996] , as adapted by Blum and Burch [2000] for the case of experts with internal state. In particular, at any point in time, for each threshold θ, we can calculate how well we would have done had we used this threshold since the beginning of time as a pair (profit θ , state θ ), where profit θ is the profit achieved so far, and state θ is the set of its current outstanding bids. For example, we might find that had we used a threshold of 5, we would have made $10 and currently have unmatched live bids {b 1 , b 2 , s 1 }. On the other hand, had we used a threshold of 1, we would have made $14 but currently have no live unmatched bids.
In order to apply the approach of Blum We now claim that under this assumption we can view the states as belonging to a metric space of diameter D ≤ B( p max − p min ). Specifically, suppose we are currently following some base-algorithm of threshold θ. Let us define a potential function equal to the number of bids in the state state θ of the algorithm we are currently following, but that are not actually in our state (we do not actually have available to us as live bids) because we already matched them at some point in the past. Note that by Assumption 1, this potential function is bounded between 0 and B. Now, suppose the algorithm we are following tells us to match a given pair of bids. If we do not have both of them in our current state, then we simply do not perform a match: this causes us to possibly make p max − p min less profit than that algorithm, but decreases our potential by at least 1. Since we never match a pair of bids unless told to by our current base-algorithm, this potential cannot increase while we are following it (to be clear, even if our current state has two bids that differ in price by more than θ , we do not match them unless our base-algorithm tells us to). Now, if the overall "master" algorithm tells us to switch from threshold θ to some other threshold θ , the potential can increase by at most B. Therefore, our overall total profit is at most B( p max − p min ) less per switch than what our profit should be according to the master algorithm.
We can now plug in the Randomized Weighted-Majority (Hedge) algorithm, using the fact that there are at most N = p max − p min possible different thresholds to use, to get the following theorem. THEOREM 5.1. Under the assumption above, for any > 0 ( is given to the algorithm), we can achieve an expected gain at least
where profit θ is the profit of the algorithm of Corollary 3.2 using threshold θ.
The proof follows the exact same lines as Blum and Burch [2000] (which builds on Littlestone and Warmuth [1994] and Freund and Schapire [1996] ). Technically, the analysis of Blum and Burch [2000] is given in terms of losses rather than gains (the goal is to have an expected loss only slightly worse than the loss of the best expert). For completeness, we give the proof of Theorem 5.1 from first principles in Appendix C. 5.2. MORE GENERAL BIDDING LANGUAGES. So far, in this article, we have required bidders to submit bids in a somewhat restrictive form: a fixed price for some interval of time. We now consider a model in which each bid can be an arbitrary function from time to price. For instance, a buyer might want to put in a bid for $100 at time t 1 , and then if that bid has not been matched by time t 2 to raise it to $120, or perhaps to slowly raise it according to some schedule until time t 3 at which point if not yet matched the buyer gives up (setting his price to $0). We assume the online algorithm only gets to observe the past history of the bid function, and that if a bidder is matched then his bid function is truncated and no longer observable. Our goal is to compete against the offline optimal for the entire bid functions. For instance, in the above example, an online algorithm might match the buyer at price $100, and the offline optimal might involve waiting until the price reached $120, even though the online algorithm never got to see the $120 bid price. Thus, in this setting, even the online algorithm cannot necessarily compute what would have been the offline optimal in hindsight.
We show that a competitive ratio of 2(ln( p max − p min )+1) for profit maximization can still be achieved in this setting by using the Greedy algorithm described earlier in this article.
The nature of the online graph is different in this model. We can still represent the bids as vertices and the matches as edges. If there is a single agent interested in a single unit, only one vertex will be used to represent the agent's bidding function. This will guarantee that the agent does not buy or sell more than one item. If there is, at some time, a buy bid at price b(t) and a sell bid at price s(t) for b(t) ≥ s(t) + θ, then an edge from b to s is inserted into the graph. Note that two vertices may enter without having an edge, and at a later time an edge may appear between them.
The algorithm remains the same: we choose a random profit threshold θ according to the same distribution as before and only include edges representing trades that achieve profit level at least θ . The algorithm selects from the edges greedily as they appear. This is still guaranteed to get a matching at least half as large as optimal. To see this, observe that at least one vertex from every edge in the optimal matching is selected by the algorithm. When an edge arrives, either one of the vertices has already been taken, or both are free. If both are free, they will be matched to each other, or at least one of them will be matched to another edge that happened to be introduced simultaneously. Thus, after an edge is introduced, at least one of its vertices has been selected. This technique also works for maximizing liquidity. However, maximizing social welfare in this setting is a bit trickier. One problem is that it is not totally clear how social welfare should be defined when the bids of the participants change with time. If only the buyers' bids change with time, then one natural definition of social welfare for a matching M is
where B is the set of matched buy bids, S is the set of unmatched sell bids, and p M (b) is the value of b's bid at the time the match was made. In that case, the Greedy algorithm still achieves its near-optimal competitive ratio. This is perhaps surprising since the online algorithm is at an extra disadvantage, in that even if it magically knew which buyers and sellers to match, it still would need to decide exactly when to make those matches in order to maximize social welfare.
Strategic Agents
Up until this point of the article, we have considered the standard competitive analysis model in which we compare performance of an online algorithm to the optimal offline solution for the same sequence of bids (or bidding functions). We now switch to a model in which each bidder instead has a private valuation for the item, and we are competing against the offline optimal for those valuations (i.e., the optimal had we known the true valuations and time-intervals in advance). In particular, this means that if we want bidders to actually bid their true valuations, then our mechanism must be (dominant-strategy) incentive-compatible. That is, no matter how other bidders behave, it should be in a bidder's best interest to report truthfully.
In this setting, we show the following results. For social welfare maximization, we present an incentive-compatible algorithm with competitive ratio at most 2 max(ln( p max / p min ), 2). For profit maximization we present a lower-bound, showing that no incentive-compatible, individually rational direct mechanism can achieve a competitive ratio sublinear in p max − p min , even when only two bids are alive at any point in time. (This lower bound actually holds even if incentive compatibility and individual rationality are only required in expectation over other agents' actions.) We then complement this with two algorithmic results: a very simple incentive-compatible algorithm with competitive ratio p max − p min , and a more sophisticated algorithm with a ratio of 1 + (plus an additive loss term) with respect to the best fixed pair of buy and sell prices, when bids are not too bursty. For these latter results we assume that the start and end times of bids are not manipulable-the only control a bidder has is over his bid value. 6.1. AN INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE MECHANISM FOR MAXIMIZING SOCIAL WELFARE. We design an algorithm that is incentive-compatible in dominant strategies for maximizing social welfare. That is, each agent's best strategy is to bid truthfully regardless of how others bid. Bidding truthfully means revealing one's true valuation.
We assume that each bidder wants to buy or sell exactly one item. We also assume that there is one window of time for each agent during which the agent's valuation is valid, and that inside the window this valuation is constant (outside this window, a seller's valuation is infinite, and a buyer's valuation is negative infinity). For example, the window for a seller might begin when the seller acquires the item, and ends when the seller no longer has storage space. A buyer's window might begin when the buyer acquires the space to store the item. Finally, we assume bidders are identifiable and therefore we can restrict each to making at most one bid.
Let us first consider a simpler setting with no temporal aspects. That is, everyone makes bids upfront to buy or sell the item. In our mechanism, we first decide a price T at which all trades will occur, if at all. We then examine the bids and only consider sell bids below T and buy bids above T . If there are more sell bids than buy bids, then for each buy bid, we select a random seller with a valid bid to match it to. We do the reverse if there are more buy bids than sell bids. Now, there are three factors that affect the expected reward of an agent:
(1) The agent's valuation for the item. This is fixed before the mechanism begins, and cannot be modified by changing the strategy. (2) The price of a possible exchange. This is set upfront, and cannot be modified by changing the strategy. (3) The probability that the agent is involved in an exchange.
The last factor is the only one that the agent has control over. For a buyer, if its valuation is below the price of an exchange, then the buyer does not wish to exchange, and can submit one bid at its true valuation, and it will have zero probability of being matched.
The more interesting case is when the agent's valuation is above the trading price. Now, the agent wishes to maximize the probability of getting to trade. If the other agents submit at least one fewer buy bid above T than the number of sell bids below T , then the agent is guaranteed a trade. On the other hand, if there are as many or more buy bids than sell bids, then the agent would not be guaranteed to purchase an item. Regardless of what bid the buyer submits above T , it will only have as much of a chance as any other buyer. So, the buyer loses nothing by submitting a bid at its true valuation.
A similar argument applies to sellers. Therefore, all of the agents are motivated to bid truthfully. 8 An important aspect of this is that the trading price does not depend on the bids. Now, let us apply this technique to the online problem.
ALGORITHM 6. Define A to be a greedy algorithm that matches incoming bids uniformly at random to existing bids. Run Algorithm 5 with algorithm A.
Under this algorithm, each agent is motivated to bid its true price. Furthermore, no agent can benefit from only bidding for a fraction of its window.
This algorithm is an instance of our Greedy algorithm, because it always matches two bids when it can. For each pair in the optimal matching (where the buy bid is above the price threshold and sell bid is below the threshold), the above algorithm will select at least one bid. If the first bid introduced is not there when the second bid arrives, then it was matched. If the first bid still remains when the second bid arrives, then (since either all buy bids or all sell bids are selected), one bid or the other bid is selected from the pair. This implies that our competitive ratio for the Greedy social welfare maximizing algorithm applies. (Section 1.2) , the landscape of what can be achieved via incentivecompatible mechanisms for profit maximization is more complicated for exchanges than for 1-sided auctions. The key issue is perhaps best understood by considering the following three classes of offline competitor algorithms, from strongest to weakest:
INCENTIVE-COMPATIBILITY FOR PROFIT MAXIMIZATION. As mentioned in the introduction
(1) The optimal algorithm that knows all bids in advance and can produce any legal matching {b 1 , s 1 ), . . . , (b n , s n )}, extracting full profit from them i (b i − s i ) . This is what we have meant throughout this article by the offline optimal solution OPT, and our algorithm of Section 3.1 achieved an optimal ln( p max − p min ) + 1 competitive ratio with respect to this "gold standard". (2) The optimal fixed profit threshold. This is the optimal algorithm that picks some profit threshold ("markup") θ and can then produce any legal matching
The analysis of Section 3.1 implies that the optimal fixed profit threshold is at most a ln( p max − p min ) + 1 factor worse than OPT, and our algorithm of Section 5.1 performs within a 1 + factor of the optimal fixed profit threshold under Assumption 1 (bids are not too bursty). (3) The optimal fixed pair of prices. This is the optimal algorithm that picks two thresholds θ b and θ s , and can produce any legal matching
As pointed out by the example in Section 1.2, the optimal fixed pair of prices can be much worse, by a p max − p min factor, than OPT or even the optimal fixed profit threshold.
In the case of 1-sided auctions, the second two benchmarks above collapse, and for that reason it is possible to be incentive-compatible and have a logarithmic competitive ratio. In contrast, we show for exchanges that no individually-rational (it is in bidders' interests to participate) incentive-compatible direct mechanism for exchanges can achieve a competitive ratio sublinear in p max − p min . It is easy to achieve a linear ratio by choosing a pair of buy and sell prices from an appropriate distribution (see Section 6.2.1 below), so this is tight. In addition, we give an algorithm using online learning methods that performs nearly as well as the best fixed pair of buy and sell prices (benchmark (3) above), so long as traffic is not too bursty. We begin with the positive algorithmic results, and then give the lower bound, followed by a discussion of some related issues. In this section, we assume a somewhat more restrictive model than in Section 6.1. In particular, we assume that bidders' start and end times are not manipulable, and the only control a bidder has is over his bid value. 6.2.1. Positive Results for Profit I: Achieving a Linear Ratio. We begin with a very simple incentive-compatible algorithm that achieves a linear competitive ratio for maximizing profit. PROOF. Consider the offline optimal matching { (b 1 , s 1 ) , . . . , (b n , s n )}, with its profit OPT = i (b i − s i ). We can rewrite this sum (pictorially, considering it "horizontally" instead of "vertically") as
Therefore, if we pick j at random from { p min , p min + 1, . . . , p max − 1} and choose θ s = j, and θ b = j + 1, the expected profit of this matching using those posted prices is OPT/( p max − p min ). Therefore, the expected profit of Algorithm 2 using these posted prices is at least as large.
Positive Results for Profit II: Competing with the Best Pair of Prices.
We now show how online learning methods can be used to develop an incentivecompatible algorithm for profit maximization that performs nearly as well as the best fixed pair of buy/sell prices in hindsight, when the sequence of bids is not too bursty. In particular, we make the same assumption used in Section 5.1 (Assumption 1) that at most B bids are alive at any one time, and in addition we assume that all events happen at integral time steps. Our conclusion, however, will be weaker in that our additive term will grow, sublinearly, with time (though we show how to remove this with the additional assumption that all bids have at most constant length). Specifically, if we define OPT fixedpair to be the optimal profit achievable by posting some fixed pair (θ b , θ s ) of buy and sell prices, and matching bids that come in on their respective sides of these prices, making θ b − θ s profit per trade, then we achieve a profit of OPT fixedpair − O(BT 2/3 ( p max − p min ) log 1/3 ( p max − p min )). Thus, for our conclusion to be non-vacuous, we need that OPT fixedpair grows at least at the rate of T 2/3 . For example, if the optimal fixed-price profit grows linearly with time (a natural assumption in any reasonably-stationary market), then our competitive ratio with respect to the best fixed pair of prices approaches 1. In gametheoretic terminology, our algorithm has sublinear additive regret with respect to this comparison class.
The algorithm is similar to that used in Section 5.1, in that we will switch between base-algorithms using a probability distribution given by an online learning method. However, there are two primary differences:
(1) We will need to use base-algorithms (experts) that themselves are incentivecompatible. In particular, the base-algorithms we combine will each be of the same type as OPT fixedpair : each is defined by a pair (θ b , θ s ) of posted buy and sell prices, and will match pairs (b, s) such that p(b) ≥ θ b and p(s) ≤ θ s using Algorithm 2, making θ b − θ s profit per trade (buying from the seller at θ s and selling to the buyer at θ b ). Since our model allows bidders control only over their prices (and not start/end times), these algorithms are incentive-compatible. In particular, Algorithm 2 does not use the actual bid values to determine which matches to make, only the start and end times. (2) We need to ensure that our method of combining base-algorithms retains incentive compatibility. Note that it is not enough to ensure that only expired bids influence our decision to switch between base-algorithms, since a bidder may decide to bid more aggressively than his true valuation in the hope that some other bidders will cause variation in our prices. In fact we will address this issue through a somewhat draconian method: we define in advance a sequence of points in time t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , . . . such that switches can occur only at those times, and throw out any bid whose time-interval contains any of those t i .
Note that one nice feature of the draconian method used in (2) above is that, after accounting for lost profit due to bids thrown out, there are no longer any costs for switching between base-algorithms, as we had in Section 5.1. However, the penalty for this is an additive term that grows with time due to the presence of the t i : for example, if every bid overlapped some t i , then our algorithm would make no profit at all (on the other hand, the t i will be spaced out farther and farther apart, so this can only happen if the rate of increase in OPT fixedpair with time drops to zero.
THEOREM 6.2. There is an incentive-compatible algorithm for profit maximization such that in T time steps,
under the assumption that at most B bids can be alive at any point in time and all bid intervals have integral endpoints.
PROOF. The algorithm is as follows: For simplicity, we assume we are given up front the number of time steps T that our exchange will be active, though this assumption can easily be removed by guessing a value and then doubling it when that guess is exceeded as in Cesa-Bianchi et al. [1997] . We now break up the T time steps into s time segments of length T /s each, so that t i = i T /s. By the assumption that at most B bids can be alive at any one time, the maximum possible gain in a single time segment is M = B( p max − p min )T /s. We now run the standard Randomized Weighted Majority algorithm with N = ( p max − p min ) 2 experts, each as defined in item (1) above, having one expert for every possible pair of buy and sell thresholds. We view the entire interval [t i−1 , t i ] as the ith trial, with each expert's gain per trial bounded in [0, M] . Note that due to ignoring bids that cross a time-interval, OPT fixedpair may be larger than the gain of the best expert by up to B( p max − p min )s. Putting this all together, for any > 0 given as a parameter to the learning algorithm, by [Littlestone and Warmuth 1994; Freund and Schapire 1996] we can achieve a total expected gain at least:
as desired.
The above result requires an additive term that increases with time. If we make the additional assumption that all bid intervals have some maximum length , we can remove this dependence on time and replace it with a dependence on . Specifically, rather than have each time segment be a fixed length T /s as in the above algorithm, we can choose each segment to be a random length chosen uniformly from [2 / , 4 / ]. Notice that for any pair of overlapping bids (of total length at most 2 ) there is at most an chance that either bid intersects an interval boundary. Thus, in expectation, at most an fraction of the profit of OPT fixedpair is lost due to throwing out such bids, and so applying the same weighted-majority bounds used above we achieve an expected gain at least:
Dividing by 2, we therefore have the following: THEOREM 6.3. There is an incentive-compatible algorithm for profit maximization such that for any given ∈ (0, 1),
under the assumption that at most B bids can be alive at any point in time and all bid intervals have length at most .
Negative Results for Maximizing Profit.
In this section, we prove that no incentive compatible, individually rational, direct mechanism can obtain a competitive ratio for profit that is sublinear in p max − p min . Furthermore, this holds even in the case where there is just one buy bid and one sell bid, both introduced at time 0 and both expiring at time 1. This lower-bound can then be extended to cases with arbitrarily-large values of OPT, by repeating it over time (with bids extending from time 2 to time 3, time 4 to time 5, etc.), so it is not just an issue of an additive constant. Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983] find an optimal mechanism for maximizing the broker's revenue in a 1-buyer 1-seller setting when the valuation distributions are common knowledge. Many of the techniques they use are applicable here, but we will apply them for understanding how much utility a broker can obtain if the distributions are unknown.
Definition 6.4. In general, a mechanism is an incentive compatible, individually rational, direct mechanism if:
(1) Direct. The agents communicate their types (i.e., value of the item, introduction and expiration time) to the mechanism. (2 Incentive compatibility and individual rationality are difficult to characterize in general in this domain. However, we will simplify matters by considering the case that there is a single buy bid and a single sell bid, both introduced at time 0 and expiring at time 1. Moreover, we will also focus on the case where the buyer and the seller know each other's value. We then compare ourselves to the broker who knows the value of the buyer and the seller.
Formally, we can now define a mechanism with three functions:
(1) p(θ 1 , θ 2 ), the probability of a trade if the seller reveals type θ 1 and the buyer reveals type θ 2 , (2) x 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 ), the expected amount paid to the seller, and (3) x 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 ), the expected amount charged to the buyer.
Observe that x 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) is not defined as the expected amount given to the seller conditional on a trade being made, but the expected amount conditional on the buyer being type θ 1 and the seller being type θ 2 . Similarly, x 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) is the expected amount charged the buyer given only θ 1 and θ 2 .
We can now specify what it means to be incentive compatible and individually rational for one buyer and one seller given x 1 , x 2 , and p. To make the statements clearer, define (4) to be the expected utility of the seller and buyer, respectively, given that their respective types are θ 1 and θ 2 and that both agents reveal their types truthfully.
(1) The mechanism is incentive compatible if for all θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ [ p min , p max ]:
Finally, the expected profit of the broker is:
THEOREM 6.6. If an online direct mechanism is incentive compatible, then for all θ 1 ,θ 2 , p(θ 1 , θ 2 ) is weakly decreasing in θ 1 and weakly increasing in θ 2 , and:
The proof of Theorem 6.6 follows quite closely the beginning of Theorem 1 of Hagerty and Rogerson [1987] who prove a similar result for budget-balanced auctions. As is shown by Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983] , extending such a result beyond the budget-balanced case is not hard. See Chapter 3 of Zinkevich [2004] for a full version of the proof.
Without loss of generality, assume p min = 0. Define n = p max (or more generally, p max − p min ). Consider the n pairs of types for the seller and the buyer, { (0, 1), (1, 2) , . . . , (n − 1, n)}. Observe that the optimal broker achieves a value of 1 in any of these scenarios. If p is the probability of trade for the online algorithm, define
Notice that by Eq. (7), the competitive ratio of the online algorithm can be no more than 1 p 1 if it satisfies individual rationality. We now show a recursive bound that gives an upper bound on p 1 . LEMMA 6.7. Define p such that:
If the mechanism has a finite competitive ratio then for all > 1, p ≥ +1 3 p 1 .
PROOF. Define
We now argue by induction. Assume that the theorem holds for all < . Now, combining Eqs. (6) and (7), and Theorem 6.6 we have that for any integer a ∈ { , n}:
Since p is nonnegative, decreasing in its first argument, and increasing in its second argument, this can be bounded above by:
By the definition of p , this can be bounded above by:
In order to obtain a finite competitive ratio, the expected utility of the broker must be nonnegative regardless of the types of the agents. Thus U 0 (a − , a) ≥ 0, and:
Since a is any integer in { , . . . , n}:
PROOF (OF THEOREM 6.5). From the above lemma, p(0, n) ≥ , and the competitive ratio is no less than
Some mechanisms are not direct, so the theorem above does not apply. An indirect mechanism may motivate the agents to lie (about valuations and/or start and end times). Furthermore, the mechanism may not even ask the agents to communicate their types: the mechanism may instead have the agents signal about their types in a different action space, which may involve an agent taking multiple actions over time.
It turns out that we can obtain the same lower bound as above even for such indirect mechanisms. To achieve this, we require that each agent have a dominant strategy in the mechanism, that is, the strategy of a bidder must be optimal regardless of the other agents' bids. (We do not require that the dominant strategy be to tell the truth.) We also require that the mechanism be (ex-post) individually rational; that is, each bidder is no worse off by participating.
9 Under these requirements, we can use the revelation principle 10 and the above technique to get the same bound.
THEOREM 6.8. No individually rational dominant-strategy mechanism can achieve a competitive ratio for profit lower than
Conclusions and Open Questions
In this article, we have derived bounds on competitive ratios for a number of basic online market clearing problems. These include the objectives of maximizing profit, maximizing liquidity according to several natural measures, and maximizing social welfare. Using the abstraction of online incomplete interval graphs, we obtain algorithms that achieve best-possible competitive ratios for most of these problems, and for the rest we are within a factor of two of the best that is achievable online. For the objective of maximizing number of trades, we demonstrate that by allowing the online algorithm to subsidize matches with profits from previous trades, we can perform as well as the optimal offline algorithm without subsidy. Thus, the ability to subsidize trades is at least as powerful as knowing the future, in this context. It is a somewhat unfortunate fact about competitive analysis that no algorithm can guarantee better than a logarithmic ratio for maximizing profit. This lower bound occurs because we are comparing the performance of our online algorithm to the best performance of any arbitrary algorithm in hindsight. However, if we restrict our comparison class to a fixed, finite set of algorithms (such as the class of all fixed-threshold algorithms), and if we assume the data is not too "bursty", then we can use online learning results to achieve a 1 + ratio, as we demonstrate in Section 5.1.
We also consider the issue of incentive compatibility, and show that our Greedy algorithm is incentive-compatible for the goal of maximizing social welfare. Thus, losing only a factor of 2 in competitive ratio we can achieve this desirable property. In fact, we show the Greedy algorithm is quite robust in that it maintains its competitive ratio even if bidders are allowed to modify their bids over time, making the task even harder on the online algorithm. For profit maximization, we show that no direct algorithm can achieve a sublinear competitive ratio, though we present an algorithm that has competitive ratio approaching 1 with respect to the best fixed pair of buy/sell prices when bids are not too bursty. We summarize our main results in Table I. 7.1. OPEN PROBLEMS. There are a number of open problems with respect to incentive-compatibility. For example in terms of competing with respect to the best fixed pair of buy and sell prices for profit maximization, our results require that bids not be too "bursty" (at most B alive at any one time). On the other hand, Deshmukh et al. [2002] provide algorithms for the offline problem where all bids are concurrent. Perhaps some combination can handle the general case.
There is also a gap between our best upper bound (2) and our best lower bound (3/2) for algorithms for the incomplete interval graph vertex-selection problem when expiration times are unknown. Algorithm 2 achieves an optimal matching but it needs to know the expiration times in advance. Related to this question, we do not know whether the Greedy algorithm can be improved upon for the setting of Section 5.2 in which a bidder may submit a bid whose value varies with time.
There has also been recent interest in offline clearing algorithms for combinatorial exchanges where a bid can concern multiple distinguishable items (possibly multiple units of each) [Sandholm 2002; Sandholm and Suri 2003; . A bid could state, for example, "I want to buy 20 IBM, buy 50 DELL, sell 700 HP, and get paid $500". As we transformed the online clearing problem to an online matching problem in an incomplete interval graph, the online problem of maximizing profit or liquidity in a combinatorial exchange can be transformed to the problem of finding a matching on an incomplete interval hypergraph online. While we can show with a simple example that a maximum matching cannot be achieved online in the hypergraph problem, it might be possible to achieve a matching with an expected size no less than half of the maximum one.
One direction of future research is to extend these results to settings where there is a market maker who can carry inventory of the commodity (sell short and long) rather than simply deciding which bids to match.
Appendix A. Lemmas on Matchings
In this section, we prove some lemmas required for the proof of the main theorem in Appendix B. We will use some standard facts and definitions from graph theory; for a review, see Kozen [1991] . Paths will be represented as sets of edges, although sometimes it will be easier to write them as a sequence of vertices. V (P) is the set of vertices of a path P. We will also use some well-known lemmas: PROOF. Suppose a vertex is in V (M) ⊕ V (M ). Then, it has an incident edge in either M or M , but not both. Hence, it can only have one incident edge in M ⊕ M , making it an endpoint of an alternating path. Suppose a vertex is at the endpoint of a path in M ⊕ M . Then, it has one edge in M ⊕ M . Observe that, if it has an odd number of edges incident to it in M ⊕ M , the number of edges in M to it plus the number of edges in M to it is also odd. But since the latter is bounded by zero and two, it is one. Therefore, the vertex cannot be in both V (M) and V (M ).
Augmenting paths capture some of the local properties of matchings. But they do not capture how to remove elements from a matching, or how to replace an element. Since these are important concepts in the online setting, we introduce some other types of paths. These paths have properties very similar to those of augmenting paths.
Definition A.4. An abridging path with respect to a matching M is an alternating path whose first and last edges are in M. A replacement path with respect to M is an alternating path whose first edge is in M, and whose last endpoint is not in V (M). PROOF. Define M to be a perfect matching on W and M to be a perfect matching on W . Then M ⊕ M consists of a set of alternating paths and cycles. Here, we are only concerned with the paths. Since these paths only begin and end at points in W ⊕ W , we can partition W ⊕ W where each set is the set of endpoints of a path in M ⊕ M . Consider a set in this partition {a, b}, where P is the path between the two elements of the set. There are three possibilities:
(1) Both vertices are in W − W . Then P is an augmenting path, and M ⊕ P is a perfect matching on W ∪ {a, b} = W ⊕ {a, b}. , and under the assumption that D ≥ g max , the above algorithm produces an expected gain at least Finally, using the fact that the total expected gain G alg (with movement costs included) is at least (1 − Dˆ g max ) t E t , and using our definitionˆ = g max /(2D), we have:
